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Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate whether the robustness of a
market mechanism that allocates complementary resources
could be improved through the aggregation of time periods
in which resources are consumed. In particular, we study a
multi-round combinatorial auction that is built on a general
equilibrium framework. We adopt the general equilibrium
framework and the particular combinatorial auction de-
sign from the literature, and we investigate the benefits and
the limitation of time-period aggregation when demand-side
uncertainties are introduced. By using simulation experi-
ments, we show that under stochastic conditions the perfor-
mance variation of the process decreases as the time frame
length (time frames are obtained by aggregating time peri-
ods) increases. This is achieved without causing deteriora-
tion in the mean performance.
1 Introduction
Allocating resources for problems with decentralized in-
formation and control is a challenge for both planners and
agents. From the planner’s perspective, s/he has to design
protocols that would function well even with incomplete in-
formation from and limited control over these free-willed
agents. From the agent’s perspective, the challenge lies in
the strategic nature of the resource allocation process; no
matter what resource allocation protocol is chosen, every
agent has to plan his/her acts considering the existence of
other selfish and unpredictable agents. Adding in uncer-
tainties that might come from either planners or agents, we
have a problem domain that is well-sought-after but still a
long way to go before being claimed well-understood.
The challenges posted by uncertainties can be elaborated
more from both planner’s and agent’s perspectives. For
planners, uncertainties might be introduced if managed re-
sources are subject to unexpected breakdown or service dis-
ruptions. For agents, uncertainties might come from dy-
namic task arrivals or delayed (or canceled) task assign-
ments. Assuming centralized control is possible, a wide
array of methodologies (e.g., stochastic programming and
Markov decision process) have been proposed and these un-
certainties are addressed quite effectively. However, in the
decentralized cases, the successes of these methodologies
are much more restricted, mostly due to the fact that nec-
essary information is often absent and the implementation
of resources allocation plan is hard, both results of the exis-
tence of selfish agents.
Market is arguably the most well-studied mechanism in
addressing issues related to decentralized information and
control [9]. Agents’ solvency is respected in market mech-
anisms and globally optimal allocation could be achieved
with proper design [11]. A lot of factors are related to the
success of using market mechanisms. For one, uncertain-
ties could potentially cause a lot of issues for both plan-
ner and agents and several remedies have been proposed.
Firstly, agents may be allowed to decommit at a penalty,
meaning that they could forfeit their commitments if the
supply or demand for the resources are disrupted unexpect-
edly. Although this design makes it much easier for agents
to flexibly deal with uncertainties, the market contracts be-
come less binding and it could be exploited by malicious
agents which could compromise the fairness of the system
and make the system less stable. Alternatively, the planner
could establish a secondary market (or aftermarket) to grant
second chances to agents affected by uncertainties.
Our approach differs from these earlier approaches in
that we do not plan to design new mechanisms or rules;
instead, we would like to explore the use of time-period ag-
gregation in reducing impact created by uncertainties. This
idea is fairly simple, and the intuition behind it is based
on risk pooling. In our case, we aggregate multiple con-
secutive time periods so that variability resulted from de-
mand or supply disruptions could be reduced. To be more
specific, we are interested in finding a common aggrega-
tion factor (how many time periods should be included in
an aggregated time frame) so that performance variability
measured by coefficient of variation is significantly reduced
while trading off measures like absolute performance and
allocation efficiency.
2 Review of Past Work
Past work on market-based approaches in resource al-
location covers a wide range of applications. Sutherland
[7] was one of the first to propose using markets in allocat-
ing computing resources. In cases where we can assume
convex preferences and competitive economy, researchers
have found promising results computationally [11, 1]. For
scheduling problems, these assumptions do not hold in gen-
eral, as it is quite common for scheduling problems to have
discrete resources (time slots) and complementary prefer-
ences, and various special designs are proposed [3, 10].
Despite the success of using markets in various setups,
a number of inefficiencies might occur when markets are
used in allocating resources. One of the major source of in-
efficiencies is the complementarity among resources. That
is, when multiple independently allocated resources are re-
quired in order to accomplish a single task, an agent might
end up with only part of the required resources, and effi-
ciency is lost as a result. This issue can be directly ad-
dressed by running a combinatorial auction [6]. Although
we use a particular type of combinatorial auction in our re-
search, the design of combinatorial auction is not our main
focus and thus we will not go too deep into the vast amount
of literature on it. Cramton et al. [2] provide a thorough
treatment on the subject.
Another major source of inefficiency is caused by uncer-
tainties. Just as complementarities might cause an agent to
unexpectedly miss some critical resources required for ac-
complishing its tasks, an agent’s preference might be altered
unexpectedly either due to changes to its current tasks or
dynamic arrivals of new tasks. These changes would result
in different resource requirements and an agent’s currently
committed resources might not satisfy the latest require-
ment. Some authors suggest the use of finance-inspired
mechanisms like options and futures in dealing with these
uncertainties [7]. In our work we focus on how to use time
period aggregation in dealing with uncertainties.
3 Problem Statement and Solution Method-
ology
The problems we are interested in studying are stochas-
tic, decentralized, and require complementary resources. In
particular, we would investigate scheduling problems with
these properties. Applications with these properties could
be easily found in many important domains.
We would like to emphasize that it is not our intent to
justify whether markets are the allocation mechanism to use
given some specific scenario; instead, we are interested in
improving the performance of a particular market mecha-
nism in responding to uncertainties if it is indeed adopted.
More importantly, we would like to achieve this perfor-
mance improvement without modifying the structure of the
market mechanism.
When we look at the characteristics of the problem again,
one would notice that resource complementarities and un-
certainties are the major issues we need to take care of.
Both issues could be resolved by introducing some struc-
tural changes to the mechanism. For example, aftermarkets
and decommitment protocols could both solve these issues
to some degree. However, just as argued earlier by Sand-
holm [6], these methods are all not as direct as address-
ing these issues directly within the market mechanism. On
resource complementarities, combinatorial auctions are the
most well-studied mechanism that by definition guarantees
only desired bundles are allocated. Of course, this doesn’t
come without a price, and added computational complexi-
ties are what one has to pay for the services of combinato-
rial auctions. In our study, we choose a special combina-
torial auction setup in order to balance the benefit and the
computational burden. The detail of this will be deferred to
subsections right after this.
The main contribution of our paper is the proposal of
using time-period aggregation as a way in handling of un-
certainties. Similar to the resource complementarities, al-
though uncertainties could be handled by various additions
to the mechanisms (like aftermarkets or decommitment pro-
tocols), it is not as direct as addressing uncertainties directly
within the mechanism. We will defer the discussion on the
time-period aggregation methodology to later sections.
3.1 Problem Statement
For illustration purpose, we choose to study a particular
job shop scheduling problem inspired by the operations of
a mega container terminal. In a typical container terminal
(see Figure 1 for a schematic view on container port op-
erations), there are quay-side cranes (QC) that load/unload
containers to/from the ship, prime movers (PM) that carry
containers around, and yard cranes (YC) that move contain-
ers between yard (storage space) and prime movers. Each
QC operator will be given a job schedule (which contains
both loading and unloading jobs), and the operations of QC
can be considered as semi-independent: each operator is
endowed with a small amount of guaranteed PM and YC
resources but has to compete for the additional usage rights
to PM and YC so that its jobs can be finished as soon as
possible. To reflect the fact that these operators actually
plan and act on their own behalves, we model the resulting
resource allocation problem in a decentralized manner, in
which each operator is represented by an agent. From the
operator’s point of view, it is very important to ensure that
operations at QC, PM, and YC are synchronized, i.e., there
is no gap between operations. In practice, the processing
times at both QC and YC are quite stable and thus can be
viewed as almost deterministic; however, due to the conges-
tion on the ground, the transport time by PM can be highly
variable. The need for operation synchronization generates
complementary resource needs, while the highly variable
PM transport time makes the problem stochastic.
Figure 1. An overview of a typical container
terminal operation.
To simplify the resource allocation process, we assume
that the planning horizon is partitioned into discrete time pe-
riods with uniform length and the number of resources (PM
and YC) is kept constant throughout the planning horizon.
Agents will be competing for the rights to use resources
within specified time periods. To address this decentral-
ized problem with complementary resource requirements
and stochastic job processing time (on PM only), we pro-
pose a special breed of combinatorial auction that is based
on the general equilibrium framework.
3.2 A Combinatorial Auction based on
the General Equilibrium Framework
Following the definition by McAfee and McMillan [5],
an auction is: “... a market institution with an explicit set
of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the
basis of bids from the market participants.” In our study,
resources are owned by a central owner and agents (QC op-
erators) have to bid for the rights to use resources in the
desired time periods. Due to the needs of having to syn-
chronize operations, an agent has to secure a bundle of (re-
source, time period) tuples that satisfies its plan for job com-
pletions. Combinatorial auction is a special class of auction
that accepts bids containing bundles. Unfortunately, com-
binatorial auctions come with hefty computational require-
ments, thus making its adoption hard. The reason for this is
that in a combinatorial auction, the bid matching problem,
or the winner determination problem, is usually modeled as
an integer linear program and it is known to be NP-hard.
Although a number of efficient implementations are pro-
posed (e.g., see Sandholm [6]), combinatorial auctions are
still not very computational affordable.
To avoid solving winner determination problems, we as-
sume that unless clearing is already feasible (implying that
the aggregate demands for all (resource, time period) tu-
ples could be met by supply), the auctioneer would not clear
the auction and finalize the allocation. Instead, the auction-
eer would adjust the current price for each tuple and an-
nounce the adjusted prices back to all agents. Hopefully,
if the auctioneer adjust the price properly, after several it-
erations agents would come up with bids that are feasible
in aggregate. To simplify the consideration, we would con-
sider agents as price takers, meaning that they would view
market prices as exogenous and not something that would
change because of their own actions.
When a price vector induces agents to generates bids that
have aggregate demands equal supplies for all tuples, we
say that a general equilibrium is reached. General equilib-
rium is first proposed by Walras [8] and has since been a
powerful concept in explaining a wide variety of economic
phenomena. There are already a number of past work on
applying the general equilibrium approach in solving dis-
tributed resource allocation problem. For example, the con-
nection between Lagrangian relaxation and combinatorial
auctions that are powered by the general equilibrium frame-
work is established in Kutanoglu and Wu [3].
From the above discussion we can see that in developing
a combinatorial auction that is based on the general equi-
librium framework, there are two major problems that need
to be addressed. The first is on how agents generate bids
and the second is on how auctioneer adjusts prices. These
details will be discussed in Section 4.
3.3 Time Period Aggregation
Combinatorial auctions can effectively handle comple-
mentarity in resource requirement. However, to address
uncertainties that are associated with job processing times,
we need additional device. In our study, we propose to
keep the auction features unchanged and only tinker with
the length of time periods. Assume that we have N time
periods in our problem. By aggregating multiple time pe-
riods into time frames, we change the set of controls (the
set of possible combinatorial bids) available to the agents.
Given identical price rates (in dollars/time period) for re-
sources, bidders would only bid for resources they plan to
use. If the time frame length is one time period, each bid-
der can bid for the exact quantity of resources needed, and
utilization will be unity (if the task schedule is determinis-
tic). For simplicity, assume that there is only one resource
type r allocated across N time periods, then U(1), the set of
all possible bids (the strategy space) when the time frame
length is one time period, is the set of all vectors of the
form < xr1, x
r
2, ..., x
r
N >, where 0 ≤ xrn ≤ M is the quan-
tity needed for time period n and M is the resource supply
per time period.
When the time frame length is y time periods (with
y integer), the new strategy space U(y) is a proper sub-
set of U(1), as the elements of U(y) are vectors of the
form: < xr1, x
r
2, ..., x
r
N >, where 0 ≤ xrn ≤ M and
xrky+1 = x
r
ky+2 = . . . = x
r
(k+1)y , for k = 0, 1, . . . , bNy c.
By increasing the time frame length from 1 to y time pe-
riods, the set of possible bids becomes smaller, from U(1)
(with MN elements) to U(y) (with Md
N
y e elements). This
rapid reduction in the strategy space means that it may be
easier to obtain the optimal bid from U(y) compared to the
optimal bid from U(1). However, it should be noted that
since U(y) ⊂ U(1), the optimal bid found in U(y) might be
suboptimal in U(1)1.
Our conjecture is that making bidders bid for resources
in longer time frames could improve the robustness of the
resulting resource allocation in face of uncertain job pro-
cessing times. Furthermore, when the time frame length
is much larger than the variability range of the resource de-
mand from the bidders, the performance of the system under
stochasticity should mimic the performance of the system
under deterministic conditions fairly well.
Our idea is based on the following simple inventory
model: each bidder has an expected order arrival schedule
(in time periods), and wishes to meet all of its customer de-
mands. However, each bidder is unaware of the underlying
stochasticity of the order quantity per time period. Thus,
the anticipated demand for period n is Dn, while the actual
demand for period n is could be higher or lower than Dn.
Any unmet demand for period n will carry over and needs
to be serve later.
When the time frame length is one time period, an opti-
mal ordering policy for the bidder is to order Dn resources
for each period n. When the time frame length is y time pe-
riods, the bidder orders maxn=(j−1)y+1,...,jyDn for time
frame j, which is composed of time periods ranging from
((j − 1)y + 1) to jy. From the definition, when the time
frame length is increased from y to 2y time periods, the or-
dering level for each time period when the time frame length
is 2y will be at least as high as the ordering level when the
1It might be tempting to argue that the utility one could get from U(y)
would be monotonically non-increasing in y. However, for a pair y1 and
y2 where y1 < y2 and their GCD = 1, no subset relationship could be
established and thus we could not conclude which case would generate a
better bid.
time frame length is y. This reduces the probability of lost
demand. We interpret this reduction in the probability of
lost demand as a reduction in the amount of jobs that are
forced to remain idle due to resource unavailability.
4 Setup of the Combinatorial Auction
Following the introduction given in 3.2, we will now for-
mally state the combinatorial auction model with time pe-
riod aggregation.
We use a multi-iteration combinatorial auction in which
each agent is allowed to submit only one quantity bid. Re-
sources are assumed to be centrally owned by the auction-
eer, and the exclusive rights to use the resources are al-
located to agents through the bidding process. The plan-
ning horizon is discretized into time periods with uniform
length, however, the resource usage rights are allocated in
time frames, which is the multiples of time periods. The
length of time frame, unit price for each (resource, time
frame) tuple (for the rest of the paper, we will just use “tu-
ple” for brevity), and the total available resource supply are
assumed to be common knowledge among agents. Agents
receive updates on the unit price for every tuple at the be-
ginning of each round, and generates a single bid containing
quantity requested for every tuple. Agents will submit their
bids simultaneously to the auctioneer and if the stopping
criterion is not met, prices for all tuples will be adjusted ac-
cording to the net demands (difference between aggregate
demand and supply). In general, prices are lowered for tu-
ples with negative net demands and prices are increased for
tuples with positive net demands. After prices are adjusted,
all agents are notified of the new prices for another round
of bidding. A feasible solution occurs when the demand for
each tuple does not exceed the total resource supply.
We will highlight two important classes of problems
that need to be addressed in the above mentioned process,
namely “bid generation” and “price adjustment”.
4.1 Bid Generation
As described in Section 3, the bidders in the system are
assumed to be price takers and thus their bid generation
problems, given tuple prices, can be treated as local op-
timization problems. Following the problem statement in
3.1, we now formally provide an abstract model for the bid
generation problem.
For every agent, a job list containing both unload and
load jobs is assigned and all unload jobs come before load
jobs. An unload job requires a sequence of resources R1,
R2, andR3 (representing QC, PM, and YC respectively). A
load job, on the other hand, requires a sequence of resources
R3, R2, andR1. No job can queue for resources in between
processes, and there is a strict precedence constraint for all
processes at resource type R1. Jobs might have different
(and stochastic) processing times at each resource. From
the description of this bidder model, we can see that both
complementarity and uncertainty are embedded.
Every bidder i has an arrival time ai, a due time di, a
makespan cost rate per time period φi and a tardiness cost
rate per time period γi. Let the time bidder i finishes its
job list be li, then the makespan of bidder i is defined as
Mi = li − ai. Let the unit price of Rk in time frame t
be Pkt and the bid B(i) of bidder i be a vector of tuples
(Rk, t). The cost function of bidder i is:∑
(Rk,t)∈B(i)
Pkt +Miφi + γi max(0,Mi − di). (1)
(1) can be minimized by solving an integer programming
model, however, for large-scale problems with hundreds of
jobs (as we study in this paper), this approach is compu-
tationally prohibitive. Alternatively, we can apply a local
search technique called relax and repair. In the relax phase,
the multi-time-frame problem is relaxed into a single-time-
frame problem and solved. In the repair phase, bidders per-
form their respective local search, using the solution from
the relax phase as an initial solution. For each time frame,
the cost function descent direction for a resource type is de-
termined, and the quantity is adjusted until a local optimum
is reached. This is repeated for all time frames and then for
all resource types. This method is shown to be very efficient
and effective [4], and the computational requirement grows
only linearly with the number of resources and time frames.
4.2 Price Adjustment
Let Ckt be the available supply for resource type Rk in
time frame t, Drikt be the demand of bidder i for resource
typeRk in time frame t for the rth iteration, P rkt be the price
for a single unit of Rk in time frame t for the rth iteration.
The price is adjusted as follows:
P r+1kt = max
(
0, P rkt + α
∑
iD
r
ikt − Ckt
Ckt
P¯
)
,
P¯ =
∑
k,t P
r
kt
∑
iD
r
ikt∑
i,k,tD
r
ikt
,
where α stands for the step size of the adjustment. Inter-
preted intuitively, the price is adjusted in proportion to the
ratio between net demand and total supply, as well as the
average resource price. Larger (smaller) values of α denote
larger (smaller) changes in resource prices for the same net
demand. A more detailed discussion on the selection of α
can be found in [4].
During our initial experiments we discovered that when
the time frame length is long, demands in adjacent time
frames may be negatively correlated, as demand moves
from the more expensive time frame to the cheaper neigh-
bors. And this could easily result in a cycle as demands
bounce back and forth. To reduce the possibility that de-
mands oscillate between adjacent time frames, we dampen
the price adjustment for selected time frames.
Without going into too much technical details, our idea
of dampening price adjustment is to first detect the exis-
tence of potential price oscillation and then identify time
frames that cause this oscillation. To achieve this, we only
need to keep track of the event of sign switch, i.e., when the
net demand changes from negative to positive or vice versa.
Whenever this is detected, we would check the sign switch
status in the adjacent time frames and if they are negatively
correlated to the current time frame, a dampening factor is
applied. This is an easy addition of the original price ad-
justment process since we only need to keep track of the
aggregate demand from the last iteration for this purpose.
Each auction is assumed to last for K rounds. All fea-
sible allocations are stored, and the one with least expected
makespan (which is the sum of expected makespan reported
by individual agents) will be selected as the final allocation.
5 Numerical Experiments
5.1 Experiment Setup
In all instances studied, there are four agents, each repre-
senting a QC operator. The implication of this is that every
agent will be endowed with exactly one unit of R1 (QC),
and no additional unit would be available. For R2 (PM)
and R3 (YC), each agent is initially assigned 2 units and 1
unit respectively2, and there are 10 units R2 and 8 units R3
available for bidding in the market. The initial prices forR2
and R3 are $50/hour and $30/hour respectively.
All bidders have identical relax-and-repair bid genera-
tion strategies, and all have makespan cost rate of $100/hour
and tardiness cost rate of $500/hour. All bidders have 10 un-
load jobs followed by 10 load jobs. To test the scalability
of our approach, we also test it on the cases with 50 unload
jobs and 50 load jobs. As the results are qualitatively the
same, we will only report results from the earlier case.
To provide necessary granularity, it is assumed that the
length of each time period is 1 minute. The processing
times at R1 and R3 are assumed to be deterministic, and
are fixed at 3 and 6 minutes respectively. The processing
time at R2 is stochastic and only realized after the auction
process, however, the mean processing time is known to the
bidders as µj for job j. We assume that the processing time
at R2 for job j follows a discrete uniform distribution that
has 20 possible values, {0.525µj , 0.575µj , . . . , (0.525 +
2Since each agent has initial endowment on R2 and R3, even it gets no
additional units from the market, its job list can still be finished. However,
the resulting makespan would be prohibitively long.
0.05i)µj , . . . , 1.475µj}. The standard deviation can be eas-
ily computed as
√∑19
i=0((0.525+0.05i)µj−µj)2
20 = 0.288µj .
We can easily change the variability while preserving the
mean by changing the range of the distribution; however,
the conclusion we obtained is qualitatively the same, and is
not presented.
By summarizing real-world data, we have designed 11
problem sets, each with differentR2 mean processing times.
To better approximate the real-world operational condi-
tions, we test four different agent arrival and due time pat-
terns for each problem set. We assume that first agent al-
ways arrives at the beginning of the first time frame and
has a due time that is f/2 hours after arrival, where f is
the number of unload jobs. In our experiments, there are
6 different time frame lengths: 15, 30, 45, 60, 90 and 120.
Further increases in the time frame length might reduce the
problems into single period time frame problems.
5.2 Results and Discussions
The effectiveness of time period aggregation could be as-
sessed by two measures: 1) the robustness of the resource
allocation plan, and 2) the performance of the allocation
plan under uncertainty (exact measures are to be defined
later). In the following analysis, we repeatedly refer to the
performance within a deterministic and a stochastic envi-
ronment. We now formally define their definitions. For the
performance in a deterministic environment, we refer to the
performance achieved by the allocation plan generated with
deterministic agents (agents have access only to the mean
processing time, and bids are generated by solving deter-
ministic problems). For the performance in a stochastic
environment, we refer to the expected performance of the
same allocation plan when the processing time of R2 is a
random variable. To estimate this stochastic performance,
we perform 5000 Monte Carlo simulations on the R2 pro-
cessing times.
5.2.1 Impact of Time Period Aggregation on Robust-
ness
The robustness of the resource allocation plan is measured
by the coefficient of variation (CV) of makespans and agent
costs. By definition CV is a normalized measure for the
variability, and is computed by dividing the standard devi-
ation by the mean. Since CV is dimensionless and scale
invariant, it allows us to compare variability across scenar-
ios consistently.
The CV of both makespans and agent costs are plotted
in Figure 2, and the resource allocation plans are indeed
more robust when the time frame lengths are longer. This
is consistent with our conjecture that longer time frames
could stabilize the unexpected fluctuations in the processing
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Figure 2. The average CV for makespans and
agent costs.
times. However, as the figure suggests, this benefit wanes
as the time frames grow longer.
Another indication that longer time frames stabilize
stochastic fluctuations is the difference between the aver-
age makespans obtained in a deterministic and a stochastic
environment (please refer to the beginning of this section
for their respective definitions). As shown in Figure 3, the
gap between the deterministic case and the stochastic case
narrows as time frame length increases.
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Figure 3. The average makespans in both de-
terministic and stochastic cases.
5.2.2 Impact of Time Period Aggregation on Perfor-
mance
The performance of the resource allocation plan is mea-
sured by the average makespan of all agents and also the av-
erage agent cost (which includes tardiness cost and resource
cost besides makespan cost). Makespans obtained under de-
terministic and stochastic cases can already been seen in
Figure 3. Agent costs under deterministic and stochastic
cases are plotted in Figure 4 and exhibit similar patterns.
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Figure 4. The average agent costs in both de-
terministic and stochastic cases.
As demonstrated in Figures 3 and 4, the performances
of the allocation plans deteriorate as time frame length in-
creases. This is expected because the deterministic mod-
els grow more constrained as time frame length increases.
However, the improving trend of the performance in the
stochastic cases suggests that for plans generated within the
deterministic environment, longer time frames could indeed
be helpful in stabilizing the fluctuations caused by unex-
pected disturbances. Although we are only showing the per-
formance averages, this observation is generally true in all
scenarios we tested (each scenario differs in agent’s arrival
times and deadlines).
6 Conclusion
An issue with allocating resources via auctions is the ro-
bustness of the resulting allocation under system stochastic-
ity. By allowing bidders to purchases resources only when
they are needed, the resulting allocations might be partic-
ularly sensitive to system stochasticity. We evaluate the
premise that increasing the time frame length in which re-
sources are auctioned off can accord stakeholders increased
robustness in its solution quality.
To investigate this hypothesis, we assume bidders know
only the mean resource requirements at the time of auction.
Our numerical results show that increasing the time frame
length when the time frame length is short (relative to sys-
tem stochasticity) decreases the variability of both the mean
cost and makespan, without increasing their mean values.
Unfortunately, once the time frame length exceeds a certain
threshold dependent on the variability in the individual pro-
cessing times, further increases in the time frame length no
longer bring the benefit of narrowing the performance gap
between the deterministic and stochastic settings.
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